Johnny Can\u27t Read or Write, But Just Watch Him Work: Assessing the Constitutionality of Mandatory High School Community Service Programs by Farrell, James C.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 71 
Number 4 Volume 71, Fall 1997, Number 4 Article 4 
March 2012 
Johnny Can't Read or Write, But Just Watch Him Work: Assessing 
the Constitutionality of Mandatory High School Community 
Service Programs 
James C. Farrell 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Farrell, James C. (1997) "Johnny Can't Read or Write, But Just Watch Him Work: Assessing the 
Constitutionality of Mandatory High School Community Service Programs," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 71 
: No. 4 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol71/iss4/4 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
JOHNNY CAN'T READ OR WRITE, BUT JUST
WATCH HIM WORK: ASSESSING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MANDATORY
HIGH SCHOOL COMMUNITY SERVICE
PROGRAMS
I. INTRODUCTION
An essential component of our republican form of govern-
ment is the freedom to hear, critically examine, and express
one's viewpoints upon a wide range of positions held and advo-
cated regarding issues dividing our society.' The maintenance of
a vigorous democracy necessitates the development of an effec-
tive system of public education.2 Our country's education system
' "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech... ." U.S.
CONST. amend. I. "[In a variety of contexts this Court has held that the First
Amendment protects the right to receive information and ideas, the freedom to hear
as well as the freedom to speak." Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 775 (1972)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). "The right to speak freely and to promote diversity of
ideas and programs is therefore one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart from
totalitarian regimes." Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
2 The legal importance of education is revealed by the fact that forty-nine of the
fifty states have constitutional provisions requiring the state legislature to create a
system of public education. See William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third
Wave of School Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C.
L. REV. 597, 602 n.29 (1994); see also CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 ("A general diffusion
of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and
liberties of the people, the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the
promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement.");
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979) (stating that public education is meant to
"inculcat[e] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic po-
litical system."); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) ("Providing public
schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a State."); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("[Eiducation is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments .... It is the very foundation of good citizenship .... [Ilt
is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is de-
nied the opportunity of an education."); John H. Garvey, Children and the First
Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 321, 338-50 (1979) (proposing that Supreme Court has
recognized three ways in which ensuring free speech contributes to child's develop-
ment: (1) trains children for participation in democratic self-government; (2) ad-
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forms and maintains a political community by equipping stu-
dents with the means of participating in the political process as
well as continuing their intellectual growth throughout their
lives.' The right of the state to indoctrinate the young through
education, however, must be carefully limited. Educators must
allow students to develop their individual interests, projects, and
personal convictions since thought control and indoctrination are
vances search for knowledge and truth; and (3) facilitates children's growth into
autonomous adults by permitting children to experience satisfaction that results
from free expression and accompanying self-realization, showing them power of
speech, offering occasions for practicing skills of rational discourse, and ensuring
receipt of information crucial to their development). Despite its importance, educa-
tion is not a fundamental constitutional right. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-37 (1973). In Brown, the Court did not hold that the state
must offer public education. Rather, the Court stated that "[s]uch an opportunity,
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made avail-
able to all on equal terms." Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
Similarly, although state compulsory education laws do not generally violate
the Constitution, states must not require students to enroll in public as opposed to
private or parochial schools. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35
(1925), the Court struck down a law requiring children between eight and sixteen
years of age to attend public schools. The Court held that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment barred states from refusing to permit parents to enroll
their children in parochial or other private schools. See id. at 535. The state may
require, however, that private schools meet certain standards and teach specified
courses in order to qualify as alternatives to public school education. See id. at 534.
The Court engrafted a narrow restriction upon compulsory education laws in
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In Yoder, the Court held that the First
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of religion for Amish people required Pennsyl-
vania to make an exception in its compulsory education laws. The Court reasoned
that long-established organized groups that can demonstrate commitment to an es-
tablished and religiously rooted way of life requiring them to withdraw from society
should not be required to send their children to public school past the eighth grade.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234-36.
3 See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("The classroom is
peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon leaders
trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers
truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative
selection.'") (alteration in original) (citations omitted); McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203, 216 (1948) ("The sharp confinement of the public schools to secular
education was a recognition of the need of a democratic society to educate its chil-
dren, insofar as the State undertook to do so, in an atmosphere free from pressures
in a realm in which pressures are most resisted and where conflicts are most easily
and most bitterly engendered."). See generally Rosemary C. Salomone, Common
Schools, Uncommon Values: Listening to the Voices of Dissent, 14 YALE L. & POLY
REV. 169, 173-85 (1996) (discussing historical "common school" experience under
which schools instilled civic virtues and national character through shared set of
values represented in school curriculum).
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anathema to a free and democratic society.4 Public school pro-
grams must educate the next generation for good citizenship by
teaching students to think clearly, discriminately, and independ-
ently.5
Public school authorities, perceiving a current crisis in the
educational process, have adopted curricular programs that de-
viate from the traditional classroom instruction in reading,
writing, and arithmetic.6 A rapidly growing number of school
districts have expanded their curriculum to include "service
learning" initiatives.7  "Service learning" initiatives, better
' See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535 (stating that "fundamental theory of liberty upon
which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State
to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public [school]
teachers only"); STEPHEN ARONS, COMPELLING BELIEF: THE CULTURE OF AMERICAN
SCHOOLING 206 (1983) ("If the government were able to use schooling to regulate
the development of ideas and opinions by controlling the transmission of culture and
the socialization of children, freedom of expression would become a meaningless
right .... ").
Freedom of expression' can indeed mean freedom from restraints, but free-
dom of expression also means freedom for expression-which means hav-
ing the capacity for understanding and self-expression. If free speech is to
be meaningful, a citizen must not only be free to speak, but should [also]
have something worth saying, together with the maturity, insight, and skill
needed to say it intelligibly.
Bruce C. Hafen & Jonathan 0. Hafen, The Hazelwood Progeny: Autonomy and Stu-
dent Expression in the 1990's, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 379, 385 (1995) (emphasis omit-
ted).t See Hafen & Hafen, supra note 4, at 418 ("[The right of children to receive an
education deserves special protection because education serves not only children's
individual interests, but also the long-term social interests of democratic societies,
which utterly depend on having a well-educated and stable citizenry."). "Americans
regard the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a
democratic system of government." School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
r See Scott G. Bullock, Lessons in Conscience; Requiring Students to "Volunteer"
Violates Constitutional Liberties, LEGAL TIMES, June 24, 1996, at 21 ("[Tihe current
values disputes between parents and schools have arisen because many schools in-
sist on taking over responsibilities that have, until recently, been left to parents and
individuals, including condom distribution, psychological counseling, and mandatory
community service."); Tamara Henry, Who's in Charge? Parents Fight Schools for
Greater Control: Growing Debate Centers on Who Teaches Values, USA TODAY, Mar.
20, 1996, at D1 (providing list of issues that "pit parents against schools").
7 See Carl Horowitz, Should Service be Mandatory? Forcing Students to
'Volunteer': A Growing Trend, INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY, Oct. 7, 1994, at Al (including
results of survey by Educational Research Service which indicated that "12.6% of
responding high schools had fully implemented a mandatory service program; 13.3%
had partially implemented a program; and another 10.2% were planning one for the
following year"); see also Stanley M. Elam, et al., The 28th Annual Phi Delta
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known as mandatory community service programs, require that
students devote a specified number of hours over their high
school careers to preparing for placement at a community service
organization, performing the various types of labor required at
such organizations, and discussing and reflecting upon their ex-
periences. These programs allegedly develop teamwork, com-
munication, and problem-solving skills by placing the student in
a "real-world" setting.8 These initiatives also attempt to instill in
each student a sense of civic obligation, to advance an under-
standing of the student's links to his or her community, and to
generate lasting pro-social behavioral inclinations.9 Mandatory
service programs are about "preparing all of our people for their
lifework of being responsible citizens, economic players and life-
long learners."10
Kappa/Gallup Poll of the Public's Attitudes Towards the Public Schools, 78 PHI
DELTA KAPPAN 41, at 56-59, available in 1996 WL 9780977 (providing poll results
which indicated that 75% supported required community service for high school
students); Tamara Henry, Community Service Gains Favor with School Boards,
USA TODAY, May 5, 1997, at D8 (providing list of states that require, encourage or
otherwise provide for school service programs).
Mandatory service programs vary from school district to school district and
from state to state. The quantity of hours required, as well as the types of organiza-
tions which qualify as approved employers, reflect reasoned decisions made by the
program creators. Drafters of service programs are influenced not only by political
considerations which shape every administrative decision, but also by constitutional
considerations. Educational authorities may be confronted by an Establishment
Clause claim should they approve religious organizations. Similarly, restricting the
types of organizations which students may serve strengthens the students' free ex-
pression claims by appearing to dictate an orthodox view. See Bullock, supra note 6,
at 22 ([I]f officials deny credit for religious service, they will be confronted with a
strong free speech case. If, however, they award credit for such service, they can
probably expect a knock on the door from hypersensitive 'seperationists.' ").
8 See infra notes 107-14 and accompanying text (analyzing motivation behind
adoption of service learning initiatives).
'The Bethlehem Area School District in Pennsylvania provided the following
reasons for mandatory community service:
(1) [Sltudents will understand their responsibilities as citizens dealing with
community issues; (2) students will know that their concern about people
and events in the community can have positive effects; (3) students will de-
velop pride in assisting others; and (4) students will provide services to the
community without receiving pay.
Scott D. Minden, The Constitutionality of Mandatory Community Service Programs
in Public Schools, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1391, 1395 (1995) (alteration in original).
10 Leonard Inskip, School-to-Work will be Among Bridges to 21st Century, STAR-
TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Sept. 17, 1996, at 13A (quoting Minnesota Governor
Arne Carlson, writing in support of federal grant application to fund state school-to-
work program).
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This Note posits that mandatory participation in community
service programs as a prerequisite to receiving a public high
school diploma, violates a student's First Amendment right to
freedom of speech." Part II of this Note discusses the competing
concerns which judges weigh in determining the extent of First
Amendment protection afforded high school students. This Part
analyzes several landmark Supreme Court decisions defining the
state's ability to regulate the speech of high school students.
Part III of this Note reviews the protection afforded to all citi-
zens by the guarantee of free speech embodied within the First
Amendment. This Part analyzes the Court's struggle to define
the distinction between mere conduct and expressive activity
entitled to First Amendment protection. In addition, this Part
examines the right to be free from compelled expression, which
was recently reinforced by the Supreme Court in Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston.12 Part IV
of this Note discusses the constitutional protection afforded ex-
" Challenges to the constitutionality of mandatory service programs have
reached the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, and Fourth Cir-
cuits. See, e.g., Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174 (4th
Cir. 1996); Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 60 (1996); Steirer v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d 989 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 824 (1993). All three challenges presented the issue of whether
mandatory community service programs constituted involuntary servitude in viola-
tion of the Thirteenth Amendment. See Herndon, 89 F.3d at 176; Immediato, 73
F.3d at 457; Steirer, 987 F.2d at 990-91. Only the petitioners in Steirer asserted that
the program compelled expression in violation of the First Amendment. Steirer, 987
F.2d at 990-91. The petitioners in Herndon and Immediato based their additional
claims upon, inter alia, the "parents' constitutional right to direct the upbringing
and education of their children." Herndon, 89 F.3d at 176; see Immediato, 73 F.3d at
457 (stating same premise). While this litigation strategy, should it succeed, would
ensure future success in challenges to other controversial curriculum decisions
made by school authorities, see, e.g., infra note 128 (discussing challenges to sex
education courses), it sacrifices the students whose rights are currently being vio-
lated upon the altar of parental control.
As this Note asserts, the Supreme Court in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Les-
bian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 2345 (1995), established a new
standard for evaluating expressive conduct. Under Hurley, the student's labor for a
service organization should be deemed protected expressive conduct. While a judi-
cial determination that mandatory service programs infringe upon the student's
First Amendment rights would not endow the students' parents with a greater abil-
ity to control value inculcative aspects of the school's curriculum, the parental rights
organizations which fund these appeals should focus upon the rights of the affected
students rather than attempting to achieve a more encompassing basis for uphold-
ing a challenge to such programs.
12 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995).
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pressive conduct. This Part analyzes the Supreme Court's latest
reformation of the test for determining whether given conduct is
imbued with sufficiently expressive elements so as to be entitled
to constitutional protection. In addition, this Part studies the
government's ability to regulate expressive conduct. Part V
analyzes mandatory community service programs under both
traditional First Amendment principles and the more carefully
circumscribed right of free expression possessed by high school
students. This Note ultimately concludes that participation in
mandatory community service programs as a prerequisite to re-
ceiving a public high school diploma constitutes expressive activ-
ity within the ambit of the First Amendment's protection. Such
programs violate the rights of students to engage in protected
expressive activity under both traditional First Amendment ju-
risprudence and the significantly restricted First Amendment
rights of high school students defined by Tinker and its progeny.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT GOES TO SCHOOL
Public school students do not "shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate."'" A student's right to free speech, however, is neither ab-
solute nor co-extensive with the rights of non-students in similar
situations. 4 The dampening of a student's constitutionally pro-
tected right to free expression reflects the vital interests of the
state in ensuring an atmosphere conducive to fulfilling the
state's educational mandate. 5 The countervailing obligation of
" Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
'4 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
'5 Courts regularly depart from traditional First Amendment principles when
the government regulates speech in government sponsored environments, such as
schools, prisons, and military establishments. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482
U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (upholding prison policy that prevented prisoners from fulfill-
ing their Islamic religious obligations, stating that "[t]o ensure that courts afford
appropriate deference to prison officials, we have determined that prison regula-
tions alleged to infringe constitutional rights are judged under a 'reasonableness'
test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of funda-
mental constitutional rights"); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 478 U.S. at 688-89
(Brennan, J., concurring) (supporting reprimand of high school student for speech
given at school-sponsored event which would be protected in another setting);
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 509 (1986) (upholding application of Air
Force regulation which prevented military physician who was ordained rabbi from
wearing yarmulke); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 737 (1974) (affirming conviction of
army physician for making statements critical of certain military personnel and
[Vol. 71:795
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the state to inculcate community values and morals in high
school students conflicts with the rights of the students to be ex-
posed to a gamut of information. In order to safeguard against
excessive abridgment of students' First Amendment rights, the
state is prohibited from prescribing orthodoxy and allegiance to a
uniform set of beliefs under the guise of defining the academic
process and/or teaching fundamental values. 6
A. Tinker to Fraser to Hazelwood
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of students' rights
in the 1943 decision of West Virginia Board of Education v. Bar-
nette.17 In Barnette, public school students who were Jehovah's
Witnesses challenged the high school's mandatory pledge of al-
legiance to the United States flag."8 The Court held that such
mandatory participation in the daily flag pledge violated the re-
spondent students' First Amendment rights, reasoning that
compelled obeisance to the flag would have a coercive effect upon
these students' religious beliefs.' 9 While the Court recognized
the existence of broad discretion on the part of educational
authorities in making decisions reflecting certain values or view-
points, the Court concluded that the First Amendment imposes a
limitation upon the power of the state to use its operation of
public schools to produce citizens with certain beliefs."
The Court did not revisit the issue of student rights until
twenty-six years later in the landmark decision of Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District.21 In Tinker,
three public school students wore black armbands to school in
symbolic opposition to America's involvement in the Vietnam
War.' The school suspended the students in accordance with a
urging resistance to Vietnam War).
6 See Russo v. Central Sch. Dist. No. 1, Towns of Rush, 469 F.2d 623, 634 (2d.
Cir. 1972) ("[N]o official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in poli-
tics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act their faith therein.") (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bar-
nette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
17 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
18 Id. at 629.
'9 See id. at 642.
2" See id.; see also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)
(asserting that state lacks power "to standardize its children").
21 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
22 Id. at 504.
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policy banning student armbands, which had been adopted two
days earlier in anticipation of their protest." The Court held
that the prohibition of armbands violated the students' First
Amendment rights since donning symbolic accessories was
analogous to "pure speech."24 The Court reasoned that school of-
ficials could only limit students' freedom of expression if such
expression would " 'materially and substantially interfer[e] with
the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school"' or would infringe upon other students' rights.' While
the First Amendment permitted reasonable regulation of ex-
pressive conduct in restricted circumstances, the Court con-
cluded that regulation of expression based solely upon its com-
municative impact, or done merely to avoid a controversy, is
insufficient to overcome the students' right to free expression."
The Supreme Court expanded the rights of high school stu-
dents to include a carefully circumscribed right to receive infor-
mation in Board of Education, Island Trees School District v.
Pico.27 In Pico, a plurality of the Court held that the arbitrary
removal of books from the school library based upon their con-
tent violated the students' constitutional right to receive infor-
mation.28 The Court recognized the school's right to determine
the original content of books in its library. The school board
2s See id.
24 Id. at 505-06.
25 Id. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
26 See id. at 509-11. In Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 107-08 (1972),
an eight-to-one majority of the Court upheld a conviction for violation of an ordi-
nance which prohibited anyone on school property from making or assisting in the
making of "any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or
good order of such school session." In evaluating whether the statute constituted a
reasonable time, place, or manner restriction, the Court concluded:
Rockford's antinoise ordinance goes no further than ... a municipality may
go to prevent interference with its schools. It is narrowly tailored to fur-
ther Rockford's compelling interest in having an undisrupted school session
conducive to the students' learning .... Rockford punishes only conduct
which disrupts or is about to disrupt normal school activities. That decision
is made, as it should be, on an individualized basis, given the particular
fact situation .... Rockford's modest restriction ... represents a considered
and specific legislative judgment that some kinds of expressive activity
should be restricted at a particular time and place, here in order to protect
the schools. Such a reasonable regulation is not inconsistent with the First
and Fourteenth Amendments.
Id. at 119, 121.
27 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
28 Id. at 855-56, 867-69.
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could not, however, remove books from the library in an effort to
prescribe the school board's views on religious, political, na-
tional, or other matters of personal conviction.29 In rejecting the
petitioner's claim of absolute discretion in matters of curriculum,
the Court reasoned that although schools have broad discretion
in determining curriculum, such discretion does not extend
"beyond the compulsory environment of the classroom" into an
area of "voluntary inquiry" such as a school library."
Pico appeared to signal a judicial retreat from the notion,
implied in Tinker, that schools should encourage student partici-
pation in the educational process as a means of facilitating the
development of young adults into responsible citizens."' The
Court confirmed its shift towards adopting a more communitar-
ian paradigm 2 in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.33 In
Fraser, a public school disciplined a student who delivered a
speech nominating another student for a student government
position. The student used sexual metaphors to describe his
candidate's qualifications for office to the approximately 600 stu-
dents present at the school assembly.34
2 See id. at 870-72.
"0 Id. at 869.
3' See Rosemary C. Salomone, Free Speech and School Governance in the Wake
of Hazelwood, 26 GA. L. REV. 253, 261-66 (1992) (critiquing shift in judicial perspec-
tive regarding First Amendment rights of students from Barnette and Tinker to Pico
and Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986)).
2 A communitarian paradigm is one which emphasizes the role of schools in
"inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic ...
system." Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979). A school's attempt to effectuate
this educational mission through the regulation of speech is inconsistent with the
democratic values it aims to instill.
' 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
34 See id. at 677-78. The speech delivered by the respondent, Matthew Fraser,
was as follows:
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his
character is firm-but most ... of all, his belief in you, the students of
Bethel, is firm.
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary,
he'll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in
spurts-he drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally-he succeeds.
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end--even the climax, for each and
every one of you.
So vote for Jeff for A. S. B. vice-president-hell never come between you
and the best our high school can be.
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring) (alteration in original).
The vast majority of the high school's student body attended the assembly,
which was part of a "school-sponsored educational program in self-government." Id.
19971
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The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not
prevent school officials from disciplining students for using of-
fensive language at school functions.35 The Court acknowledged
the need to balance the students' freedom of expression in school
against society's interest in "teaching students the boundaries of
socially appropriate behavior."" The Court recognized that the
government could not restrict the free speech rights of adults
under similar circumstances.37 The Court noted, however, that
the rights of students are not necessarily coextensive with the
rights of adults, and concluded that the manner of speech appro-
priate for a school assembly or classroom is a decision within the
exclusive domain of school officials. 8
The Court, while professing fidelity to Tinker, considerably
limited its usefulness for protecting student speech in Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeirer."9 In Hazelwood, the principal of
Hazelwood East High School ordered the faculty advisor of the
student newspaper to remove two articles from the next edition
of the school paper; one regarding pregnancy and the other on
the effect of parental divorce upon students." Members of the
journalism class who wrote and edited the school newspaper
brought an action against the principal and the school district.4
The Court concluded that school authorities could restrict ex-
pression in the school newspaper if such restrictions were rea-
sonable and held that it was reasonable for the principal to reject
the articles at issue on the basis that they did not meet the stan-
dards and skills for which the newspaper had been reserved.42
The Court began its analysis with reference to Tinker and
the protection of students' First Amendment rights. The Court
noted, however, that the "special characteristics of the school
environment" grant school administrators the duty and power to
alter such rights as they deem necessary in order to serve the
at 677. "Students who elected not to attend the assembly were required to report to
study hall." Id.
See id. at 681-87.
'6 Id. at 681.
37 See id. at 682.
.8 See id. at 682-83.
39 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
40 Id. at 264.
41 See id.
" See id. at 267-76.
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goal of educating students.43 The Court distinguished Hazelwood
from Tinker, emphasizing that the latter involved symbolic stu-
dent speech in a non-curricular setting while the students in Ha-
zelwood were attempting to use a school-sponsored publication to
convey information and various opinions." The Court thus dis-
tinguished between tolerating student expression, as in Tinker,
and "lend[ing the school's] name and resources" to student ex-
pression.45 The Court asserted that when a newspaper is pub-
lished by the school and prepared by students under the direct
supervision of a teacher, "educators do not offend the First
Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and
content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activi-
ties so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns."46
B. Summary of the Supreme Court's Decisions
Attempts by the Court to balance the school administrators'
and students' competing concerns have not resulted in a concise
analytical framework. A careful analysis and comparison of the
Court's landmark decisions on students' First Amendment rights
reveals three principles which assist in evaluating the constitu-
tionality of mandatory public high school community service pro-
43 Id. at 266 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
44 Id. at 270-71.
's Id. at 272-73.
'6 Id. at 273. The Court applied a public forum analysis to determine the consti-
tutionality of the editorial restrictions. Id. at 266-70. Perry Education Association v.
Perry Local Educators' Association, 460 U.S. 37 (1983), establishes the framework
for permissible restrictions on expressive activities in a public forum.
In a classic, or quintessential, public forum, such as a park or sidewalk, the
Court strictly scrutinizes a content-based regulation to see whether it is narrowly
drawn to serve a compelling government interest. The Court also requires a com-
pelling interest to justify any blanket prohibition of all speech. See id. at 45.
When the forum is not an historic type of public forum, but has nonetheless
been opened to the public's first amendment activities, the Court again strictly
scrutinizes content regulation, but allows the government to close the forum en-
tirely. See id. at 45-46.
Finally, in a non-public forum, the government is free to exclude speech or
speakers based upon the content of the message, except in cases of viewpoint dis-
crimination. See id. at 46; see also Mark G. Yudof, Tinker Tailored: Good Faith, Ci-
vility, and Student Expression, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 365, 375 (1995) ("After Hazel-
wood, ... [o]nce it is determined ... that the government is somehow implicated by
the [student] speech, then any limitations placed on that speech must be made in
good faith and be reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical purpose.").
1997]
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grams. First, public schools may regulate non-political student
speech which constitutes a component of the school curriculum
so long as the regulation assists the educational process.4' Sec-
ond, if school officials reasonably believe that student speech will
substantially disrupt school activities or interfere with the rights
of other students, the school may restrict student speech which
is not a part of the school curriculum." Finally, the state may
not use the operation of public schools to inculcate certain beliefs
through compelled expression of orthodox values.49 The third
principle derived from the Court's decisions should operate to in-
validate mandatory high school community service programs.
III. COMPELLED SPEECH
The First Amendment guarantees the right of every person
to express his or her opinion." The Supreme Court has recog-
nized that an individual's First Amendment right to speak nec-
essarily encompasses the right to refrain from speaking when
the government seeks to compel speech that advances its own
message.8 ' The Court expanded this vital protection to encom-
pass state action compelling one private party to carry or foster
the speech of another private party.52  In Hurley v. Irish-
47 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266-67 (noting that school may limit in-school
student speech inconsistent with fundamental public school education values).
48 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507 (permitting restrictions on student behavior even
though such restrictions are likely to disrupt classroom activity).
4 See Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 636-42 (1943) (stating that "[ilf
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official ... can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics ... or other matters of opinion or force
citizens [to conform by] word or act .... ").
o U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press.").
51 See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (holding that State of
New Hampshire could not require its citizens to carry objectionable message, "Live
Free or Die," on license plates); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 372-73 (1976) (holding
that sheriffs employees could not be compelled to support political party as condi-
tion of continued employment); Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(prohibiting State from requiring students to participate in teacher-led pledge of al-
legiance to United States flag); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593-94 (1992)
(invalidating as violative of Establishment Clause government-sponsored prayer at
public secondary school graduation ceremony on grounds that psychological pres-
sure on adolescents to participate was constitutional equivalent of legal coercion);
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961) (overturning as invasive of "freedom of
belief and religion" Maryland requirement that civil servants utter oath affirming
belief in God).5' See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Bos-
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American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, the Court
reaffirmed the right of all private parties to be free from espous-
13ing a message or belief inconsistent with their own.
In 1992, the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual
Group of Boston (GLIB)54 submitted an application to participate
in the 1992 Boston St. Patrick's Day-Evacuation Day Parade
(Parade).5 The South Boston Allied War Veterans Council
(Council), the organizer of the Parade, denied this application
citing safety reasons and a lack of sufficient information regard-
ing GLIB.56 Pursuant to state court order, GLIB marched in the
1992 Parade.57 When GLIB applied to march in the 1993 Parade,
however, the Council again denied permission, asserting that its
decision to exclude groups with sexual themes formalized the
Parade's traditional religious and family values.58
ton, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 2343 (1995) (holding that organizers of South Boston's St. Pat-
rick's Day Parade did not have to include homosexual organization in Parade since
organizers disagreed with message respondents sought to convey); Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(striking down state utility commissioner's rule requiring privately owned utility to
include in its billing envelopes third party communication with which utility disa-
greed); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Turnillo, 418 U.S. 241, 255-56 (1974) (declaring
unconstitutional Florida statute granting right of reply to political candidate at-
tacked in newspaper). But see PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-
88 (1980) (holding California Supreme Court's interpretation of its constitution to
entitle citizens to "exercise free expression and petition rights on shopping center
property" did not violate shopping center owners' First Amendment rights since
owners were not being "compelled to affirm their belief in any governmentally pre-
scribed position or view" and were able to expressly disavow any connection with
speaker's message by posting signs).
3Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2351.
' See id. at 2341. GLIB was formed for the express purpose of marching in the
1992 Parade in order to "celebrate our Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and bi-
sexual individuals," "remind people that there are lesbians, gays, and bisexuals
within all demographic areas, including people of Irish heritage," and to support the
Irish-American homosexual and bisexual men and women in New York City who
were seeking to participate in the New York St. Patrick's Day Parade. Amicus Brief,
The Individual Rights Foundation in support of Petitioner, Hurley v. Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995) (No. 94-749)
(Mar. 13, 1995) (quoting GLIB fact sheet).
See Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2341.
See Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston v. City of Bos-
ton, 636 N.E.2d 1293, 1295 (Mass. 1994), rev'd sub nom, Hurley v. Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995).
See Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2338.
s See id. GLIB brought suit alleging violations of the state and Federal Consti-
tutions as well as the Massachusetts public accommodations law. See id. at 2341.
The public accommodations law prohibits "any distinction, discrimination or re-
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The Supreme Court held that the state-mandated inclusion
of GLIB altered the expressive content of the Parade and vio-
lated the Council's First Amendment rights.59 The Court found
the South Boston celebration to be a constitutionally protected
expressive activity.6 Although the Council was lenient in ad-
mitting participants in the Parade, the Court reasoned that an
organizer does not forfeit its autonomy to choose its own message
merely by "combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit
their themes to isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject
matter of the speech."'" Thus, the state's application of the pub-
lic accommodations law violated the Council's autonomy by com-
pelling the Council to propound a message with which it disa-
greed.6'
striction on account of ... sexual orientation ... relative to the admission of any per-
son to, or his treatment in any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement
.... " MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 98 (West 1995). Under Massachusetts law,
.place[s] of public accommodation, resort or amusement" include "any place,
whether licensed or unlicensed, which is open to and accepts or solicits the patron-
age of the general public .... Id. § 92A.
The trial court granted an order mandating GLIB's inclusion in the Parade on
the grounds that the Parade was not an expressive activity. See Hurley, 115 S. Ct.
at 2342. Rather, the court found it was a "public accommodation" under Massachu-
setts law and excluding GLIB because of the sexual orientation of the members of
the group violated the anti-discrimination provisions of the public accommodations
law. See id. at 2342. The trial court reasoned that the Council's lack of selectivity in
admitting sponsors and participants rendered the Parade a public accommodation.
See Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 636 N.E.2d at 1295-
96 (Mass. 1994). The trial court explained that the range of interests and viewpoints
represented by the Parade's participants and sponsors, the Council's lack of written
procedures, criteria, and standards for selecting participants, and the participation
of groups who were not required to submit a Parade application supported the view
that the Parade was a recreational activity, open to the public-at-large, which lacked
an expressive purpose. See id.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed. See id. at 1300. The
appellate court held that the 1993 Parade lacked an expressive purpose and was a
public accommodation subject to the Massachusetts prohibition against discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation in public accommodations within the state. See id
at 1297-1300. The Council filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United
States Supreme Court seeking reversal of the decision, which was granted. See
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 115 S. Ct. 714
(1995).
9 See Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2340-41.
See id. at 2345.
61 Id.
62 See id. at 2347. The Court rejected GLIB's assertion that their inclusion
would not compromise the Council's message, reasoning that the Parade does not
consist of individual segments; rather its message is distilled from each unit's indi-
vidual presentation, which contributes to a common theme. See id. at 2349.
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IV. SYMBOLIC SPEECH
A. Defining Expressive Conduct
The Supreme Court, in Stromberg v. California, extended
First Amendment protection beyond spoken or written expres-
sion to encompass communicative conduct.' Since Stromberg,
however, the Court has failed to articulate and apply consis-
tently a test for determining whether given conduct is suffi-
ciently imbued with expressive elements so as to be protected by
the First Amendment.
In Spence v. Washington, the Court attempted to define the
ambit of expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment."
In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed Spence's
conviction for affixing a peace symbol to an American flag and
displaying it from his window in violation of the state flag mis-
use statute.6 The Court established a two-part inquiry to de-
termine whether this conduct constituted speech for the pur-
poses of the First Amendment. First, the actor must possess
"[a]n intent to convey a particularized message."" Second, there
must be a sufficient likelihood that the particularized message,
viewed under the circumstances in which the conduct occurred,
would be understood by those who viewed it.67
While the Spence test provided a guide for identifying ex-
pressive conduct, the Court failed to apply this test in cases
Since the Parade was not the only conduit for the expression of GLIB's beliefs,
the Court determined that the state did not possess a legitimate, compelling objec-
tive which would allow the public accommodations statute to restrict the Council's
constitutionally protected right of free expression. Compare Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at
2349-51, with Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 629 (1994) ('[The cable
system functions ... as a conduit for the speech of others .... "). Unlike a parade, a
cable television station is "a franchised channel giving monopolistic opportunity to
shut out some speakers." Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2349. This power gives rise to a com-
pelling governmental interest distinguishable from GLIB's less-compelling interest
in marching in the St. Patrick's Day Parade. See id.
For further analysis of the Boston St. Patrick's Day Parade controversy, see
James C. Farrell, Comment, Should Irish Eyes be Smiling? The Hidden Issue of
State Action in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Bos-
ton, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 313 (1996).
6 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (invalidating state statute punishing display of flag
in opposition to organized government).418 U.S. 405 (1974).
6' See id. at 413-15.
Id. at 410-11.
See id. at 411.
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where it sought to evaluate purportedly expressive conduct.'
The Court's failure to apply consistently its own test "strongly
suggest[ed] that whatever its virtues, the Spence test ... [had]
limited utility."69 Furthermore, as Professor Laurence Tribe
noted, the Court's failure to articulate a basis for differentiating
between speech and expressive conduct meant that "any particu-
lar course of conduct [could] be hung almost randomly on the
'speech' peg or the 'conduct' peg as one [saw] fit."7 °
The Supreme Court, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Les-
bian and Bisexual Group of Boston, partially dissipated the cloud
of uncertainty surrounding the distinction between speech and
conduct.71 The Court specifically castigated the articulation of
the Spence test by some lower courts which required an intent to
convey a "particularized message. "" Requiring a "narrow, suc-
cinctly articulable message" would, in the eyes of the Court,
leave unprotected the "unquestionably shielded painting of Jack-
son Pollock, music of Arnold Schonberg, or Jabberwocky verse of
Lewis Carroll."3
Hurley's abrogation of the requirement that a particularized
intent be present vitiates the Spence test. In determining
whether conduct is sufficiently expressive to trigger constitu-
tional protection, the proper inquiry involves analyzing the na-
ture of the activity as well as the context and environment in
which it is performed. Only by analyzing the conduct in the light
of the surrounding circumstances can a court ascertain whether
the "activity was sufficiently imbued with elements of communi-
' See Peter Meijes Tiersma, Nonverbal Communication and the Freedom of
"Speech," 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1525, 1539 n.61 (listing cases where Court failed to
utilize Spence test); see, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (finding
even objectionable viewpoints to be constitutionally protected); Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (allowing state limitations on public nudity).
6' Tiersma, supra note 68, at 1539.
70 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-7, at 827 (2d ed.
1988); see also Tiersma, supra note 68, at 1561 (proposing analytical framework un-
der which nonverbal communication constitutes protected speech only if. (1) actor
intended to convey message through his actions; (2) actor intended viewers to re-
ceive and understand message; and (3) actor intends viewers to realize message is
being conveyed by conduct).
115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995).
72 Id. at 2345.
71 Id.; see also Tiersma, supra note 68, at 1539 ("To require conduct to convey a
'particularized' message would impose a stricter standard on nonverbal communi-
cation than on verbal locution, with no pervasive justification.").
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cation to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments."74
B. Regulating Expressive Conduct
While the Court has not fashioned a precise framework for
determining whether certain "expressive" acts trigger constitu-
tional protection, the Court has delineated the boundaries of
government regulation of constitutionally protected expressive
activity. In United States v. O'Brien, the Court fashioned a four-
part test for determining when a governmental interest suffi-
ciently justifies the regulation of expressive conduct:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified [11 if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; [2 if it fur-
thers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and [41 if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the fur-
therance of that interest.75
The O'Brien test, by its terms, applies only if the regulation
under review is content-neutral.76 If the regulation constitutes a
content-based restriction upon free expression, the regulation
must be analyzed under traditional First Amendment princi-
74 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. at 409.
ITihe expressiveness of conduct should be gauged by the language that
Spence explicitly articulated as a test: whether, considering "the nature of
[the] activity, combined with the factual context and environment in which
it was undertaken," we are led to the conclusion that the "activity was suf-
ficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments .... "
Troster v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections, 65 F.3d 1086, 1090 (3d Cir. 1995)
(quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 409-10) (alteration in original)); see also Louis Henkin,
On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 80 (1968) ("If [conduct] is intended as ex-
pression, if in fact it communicates, especially if it becomes a common comprehen-
sible form of expression, it is 'speech.' "); Tiersma, supra note 68, at 1547 ("A real-
istic definition of 'speech' ... cannot stop at speaking or language, but must extend to
nonverbal actions and symbols that are functionally equivalent to speech.")
(emphasis omitted).
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
76 Id. at 385. If the government sought to regulate the conduct because of some
perceived harm associated with the actor's message, the regulation would not satisfy
the third prong of the O'Brien test. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1968); 4 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK,
TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.49, at 362 (2d
ed. 1992).
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ples.77 Unless the expressive activity is prohibited because its
message falls within one of the categories of speech which the
Court finds punishable in accordance with the First Amendment,
the conduct cannot be proscribed unless the restriction survives
strict scrutiny.78 In other words, for the restriction to be found
constitutional the government must have a compelling interest
in prohibiting such a message and the means adopted by the
government must be sufficiently tailored to further that inter-
est.79
C. Expressive Conduct in Schools
Judicial assessments of school hair length and dress codes,
while somewhat inconsistent, help to clarify the level of protec-
tion courts afford expressive student conduct.s In analyzing the
constitutionality of hair length codes, courts generally refuse to
interfere with regulations adopted by the school board.8 The
predominant inquiry is not whether the regulations are expedi-
ent or effective, but whether they constitute a reasonable exer-
See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507-09.
7 See 4 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 76, § 20.49, at 362.
7' See id. The government may enforce content-neutral restrictions on speech in
a public forum only if the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a significant gov-
ernmental interest and leaves open adequate alternative channels for communica-
tion. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
The restrictions cannot be merely to "avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. Content-based
restrictions on speech in these areas must serve a compelling government interest
and the restrictions must be narrowly drawn to achieve that interest. Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
" School "grooming" rules may also implicate a student's Fourteenth Amend-
ment right to equal protection under the law, as well as a student's constitutionally
protected liberty interest. See, e.g., Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284 (1st
Cir. 1970) (finding that absent justification, school's suspension of student for fail-
ure to cut his hair is violation of Due Process Clause as well as First Amendment);
Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 168 (Alaska 1972) (holding that right of public school
students to control their own appearance by wearing their hair in accordance with
their personal preference is fundamental right under Alaska's Constitution); Scott v.
Board of Educ., 305 N.Y.S.2d 601, 606 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969). But see New Rider v.
Board of Educ., 480 F.2d 693, 698 (10th Cir. 1973) (finding that wearing of long hair
does not fall within parameters of pure speech).
81 See, e.g., Domico v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 675 F.2d 100, 102 (5th Cir. 1982)
(finding school dress code prohibiting beards on school employees rationally related
to school's goal of "teaching hygiene, instilling discipline, and ... compelling uniform-
ity"); New Rider, 480 F.2d at 698 (finding hair regulation for junior high school stu-
dents rationally related to state objective in instilling pride and morale among stu-
dents); Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 616 (5th Cir. 1972) (refusing to intervene in
local school affairs when fundamental rights are not implicated).
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cise of the power and discretion of the school board. 2 These
regulations meet the rationality test when the school board in-
troduces evidence that unusual hairstyles or facial hair could re-
sult in the distraction of other students and disrupt or impede
the maintenance of a proper classroom atmosphere."
Hair length regulations typically receive greater judicial def-
erence than school dress codes.' One reason for engaging in
more exacting judicial scrutiny of hair length regulations is that
the impact of this regulation extends far beyond the borders of
the classroom and infringes deeper into the personal rights of the
student.' While students can easily change their clothes to re-
flect their personal preferences outside of the school, grooming
regulations require an appearance modification, thereby prevent-
ing the presumption of communicative personal appearance once
school has ended. 6
82 See Davenport v. Randolph County Bd. of Educ., 730 F.2d 1395, 1397 (11th
Cir. 1984) (noting "per se rule" that grooming regulations are constitutionally valid
and applying "reasonableness" test); accord Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 261
(10th Cir. 1971) (holding no substantial federal question implicated by school hair
length codes); Ferrara v. Hendry County Sch. Bd., 362 So. 2d 371, 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978) (placing burden on student to show regulation is "reasonably intended to
accomplish a constitutionally permissible objective" and finding that liberty interest
in hair length does not rise to level of constitutional significance).
"' See Akin v. Board of Educ., 262 Cal. App. 2d 161, 168 (Ct. App. 1968)
(upholding school board's good-grooming policy where board solicited expert opin-
ions of other educators and policy based upon previous experiences of disruptive ef-
fect). But see Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1036-37 (7th Cir. 1969) (finding evidence
of disruption inadequate to support school's hair length regulation for males); Black
v. Cothren, 316 F. Supp. 468, 472 (D. Neb. 1970) (evidence presented by school in-
sufficient to link discipline problems with hair length).
m See Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411, 419 (D. Vt. 1970) ("The cut of one's
hair style is more fundamental to personal appearance than the type of clothing he
wears."). But see Royer v. Board of Educ., 365 N.E.2d 889, 891 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977)
(reasoning that Supreme Court's repeated refusal to review hair length cases im-
plies constitutional unimportance). Justice Douglas criticized the Court for consis-
tently refusing to decide the constitutionality of school hair length regulations. See
New Rider, 414 U.S. at 1098 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
' See Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259, 1264 (7th Cir. 1970) (recognizing that
"impact of hair regulations extends beyond the schoolhouse gate"); Breen, 419 F.2d
at 1036 ("The right to wear one's hair at any length ... is an ingredient of personal
freedom protected by the United States Constitution.").
8 See Breen, 419 F.2d at 1037-38 (recognizing that limiting compliance with
hair length regulation to school hours would be "impossible"); Dunham, 312 F. Supp.
at 419 (same); Westley v. Rossi, 305 F. Supp. 706, 711 (D. Minn. 1968) (same); see
also Steven R. Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regu-
late Student Conduct and Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U. PA. L. REv.
373, 401 (1969) (noting that "skirts can be quickly changed for out-of-school activity;
hair cannot"). A plausible distinction between dress codes and hair regulations is
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The failure of courts consistently to find grooming regula-
tions and dress codes violative of the First Amendment rights of
students reveals a desire to avoid excessive judicial interference
with the daily operations of schools. 7  An attempt to analogize
mandatory service programs to either dress codes or grooming
regulations does not indicate whether educators should be ac-
corded greater deference in adopting these programs. Manda-
tory service does not require an appearance modification that
would prevent students from exercising their full gamut of First
Amendment rights at the conclusion of the service. The student,
however, is forced to engage in expressive activity against his or
her will outside the confines of the school campus. The student's
message is not merely projected to other students and school
employees, it is directed towards the public at large. The irrepa-
rable nature of this infringement, therefore, counsels the appli-
cation of a lesser degree of deference to the decision of school
that certain forms of attire, whether particular articles of clothing or the mere color
of the student's ensemble, connote gang affiliation. The level of violence within pub-
lic high schools has risen steadily in recent years and overt indications of gang-
related activity within the school constitute a clear potential disruption of the edu-
cational process. In addition, the presence of youth gangs decreases participation in
the educational process through the intimidation of students who do not wish to
draw the attention of these violent elements. For an analysis of the constitutionality
of school dress codes designed to reduce gang-related violence in public high schools,
see Paul D. Murphy, Note, Restricting Gang Clothing in Public Schools: Does a
Dress Code Violate a Student's Right of Free Expression?, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1321
(1991).
" See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 114 (1968) (Black, J., concurring)
(asserting that judiciary lacks ability to monitor "the curriculum of every public
school in every hamlet and city in the United States"); see also David A. Diamond,
The First Amendment and Public Schools: The Case Against Judicial Intervention,
59 TEX. L. REV. 447 (1981) (positing that school's indoctrinative function precludes
judicial intervention and recognition of students' First Amendment rights); Bruce C.
Hafen, Developing Student Expression Through Institutional Authority: Public
Schools as Mediating Structures, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 663, 664 (1987) ("[Clourts should
presume the constitutional validity of rational decisions by public school officials
that implicate educational matters, both curricular and extra-curricular."). But see
Stanley Ingber, Liberty and Authority: Two Facets of the Inculcation of Virtue, 69
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 421, 456-57 (1995) (asserting that judiciary should not hesitate to
review policies instituted by school authorities since judges are detached from con-
troversies between students and educators and are better able to recognize educa-
tional benefits of enforcing First Amendment guarantees).
Courts also avoid intervening in school policy decisions by holding that the stu-
dent conduct at issue lacks sufficient expressive content to qualify for First
Amendment protection. See Olesen v. Board of Educ., 676 F. Supp. 820, 822 (N.D.
Ill. 1987) (upholding school's "anti-gang" policy which prohibited wearing of earrings
by male students on grounds that message conveyed by student's pierced ear not
within scope of First Amendment protection).
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authorities who enact such programs.
V. ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY SERVICE PROGRAMS
In order to assess the constitutionality of mandatory com-
munity service programs, a court must conduct three inquiries.
First, the court must determine whether the student, while ful-
filling his or her service requirement, is engaged in a protected
form of expression. Second, the court must determine whether
the educator's proffered justifications for the program survive
the test for constitutional restriction upon expressive activity
defined in United States v. O'Brien. Finally, if the regulation
does not satisfy the O'Brien test, the court must determine
whether the restriction upon students' freedom of expression
comports with traditional First Amendment jurisprudence.
A. Community Service as Expressive Conduct
1. The State of the Law Before Hurley: Steirer v. Bethlehem
Area School District
In Steirer v. Bethlehem Area School District, the Third Cir-
cuit held that the high school graduation requirement of com-
munity service instituted by the respondent school district did
not constitute expressive activity afforded protection by the First
Amendment.' The Board of Directors required all high school
students 9 to participate in a course entitled the "Community
Service Program" ("Program"). The Program, jointly adminis-
tered by the high school principal, the district coordinator, and
the school counselor, required each student to complete sixty
hours of community service at either an approved community
service organization or an "experimental situation" as a prereq-
uisite to graduation.9
987 F.2d 989, 997 (3d Cir. 1993).
An exception was made for those students in special education classes. See id.
at 991.
" See id.
91 See id. The Program provided students with a list of over seventy approved
service organizations, ranging from AIDS outreach programs to the Girl Scouts. See
id. Students or parents could submit alternative potential organizations for ap-
proval so long as the organization "(i) 'demonstrate[s] [its] intention to promote the
welfare of the community'; (ii) does not 'discriminate against any race, religion or
sex'; and (iii) 'provide[s] assurances that the [ I organization is free from doctrinal
motivation ....' "Id. (alterations in original) (citing App. at 191).
[An] experimental situation allows a student to "develop [his or her] own
1997]
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Two high school students and their parents brought suit in
federal district court seeking injunctive relief.92 The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding
that the program did not compel expression in violation of the
students' First and Thirteenth Amendment rights. 3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit af-
firmed, reasoning that the extent of expressive conduct is espe-
cially limited when the conduct is associated with the school's
educational program.94 The court acknowledged that the re-
quired community service could implicate First Amendment con-
cerns if the Program necessitated service in an organization
whose central message conflicted with the students' political, re-
ligious, or moral views.95 The court concluded, however, that the
Program did not compel expression protected by the First
Amendment since "[it is just as likely that students performing
community service under the auspices of a highly publicized re-
quired school program will be viewed merely as students com-
pleting their high school graduation requirements" rather than
expressing the "particularized message of [the students'] belief in
the value of community service and altruism."96
2. Analysis After Hurley
The Third Circuit in Steirer applied a stricter test for de-
termining whether conduct constitutes constitutionally protected
expression than current jurisprudence seems to require. The
court's reformation of the expressive conduct test articulated in
Hurley obviated the requirement that the actor intend to convey
a particularized message through the conduct. By deleting the
individual community service experience." This alternative experience re-
quires parental approval, the recommendation of the school counselor, and
verification by a responsible adult. It may involve the arts, community
special events, aid to the elderly, the handicapped or the homeless, emer-
gency services, the environment, library/historical research, recreation ac-
tivities, or tutoring.
Id. (internal citations omitted) (alterations in original).
92 See id. at 992.
93 See id. at 993, 998. The affected students and parents also brought suit on the
grounds that the Program constituted involuntary servitude in violation of the Thir-
teenth Amendment. See id. at 997. This Note does not address the validity of the
students' Thirteenth Amendment claims.
94 See id. at 996.
9" See id.
96 Id. at 997.
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first prong of the traditional Spence test, a problem unique to
analyzing compelled conduct as compelled expression proscribed
by constitutional law is avoided. The typical expressive conduct
scenario involves nonverbal communication by an actor seeking
to convey his or her own message through the conduct. In ana-
lyzing compelled conduct cases, like those presented by manda-
tory community service programs, the party compelling the con-
duct, not the actor, seeks to propound a message through the
actor's conduct. The first prong of the Spence test is inappropri-
ate since the student actors do not intend to convey a message
when they are compelled to act against their will or face serious
repercussions. 97
In order to determine whether a student's participation in
mandatory community service programs constitutes expressive
conduct, the message that is conveyed must be ascertained. The
petitioners in Steirer asserted that the school sought to commu-
nicate esoteric student approval of the value of community serv-
ice.9" A second potential "message" that third parties observing
the actions of these students may perceive, however, is the stu-
dents' apparent belief in the message of the organizations on
whose behalf the students work.99 Both of these potential mes-
sages are sufficiently ascertainable for a court to conclude that
the service programs require adequate expressive conduct to fall
within the protective umbrella of the First Amendment.
The facts and circumstances surrounding the students' per-
formance of community service indicate that the students' con-
duct would be imbued with sufficiently expressive elements so as
to be entitled to constitutional protection. The Third Circuit
concluded that the highly-publicized nature of the program ren-
ders the students' conduct "just as likely" to be viewed by an ob-
server as a student fulfilling his high school graduation require-
ments.' A comparison of the Boston St. Patrick's Day Parade at
issue in Hurley with mandatory service programs indicates that
public awareness of the school boards' programs does not ex-
97 See Bruce J. Rome, Note, Mandatory Community Service in Public High
Schools: Constitutional Problems in Steirer v. Bethlehem Area School District 28
U.S.F. L. REV. 517, 549 (1994) ("Application of the first prong of the Spence test is
inappropriate in the case of mandatory community service because persons never
intend to convey a message when they are compelled to act against their will.").
See Steirer, 987 F.2d at 996.
See Rome, supra note 97, at 549-50.
10 See Steirer, 987 F.2d at 997.
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punge the expressive elements of the students' conduct.
The group seeking inclusion in the Boston Parade com-
menced its highly-publicized litigation in 1993.01 The contro-
versy spanned three years, including one year during which the
Parade was canceled and replaced by a protest march. 10 2 Manda-
tory community service programs, while the subject of significant
litigation, have not been litigated in a public forum to the extent
that the St. Patrick's Day parades in Boston and New York have
been.
In addition, the context in which the student community
service is performed is radically different from that of a public
celebration of cultural heritage. Students working in community
service organizations do not labor in an atmosphere redolent
with educational trappings which could convey to a reasonable
observer that the student was acting under the auspices of the
school authorities. Instead, it would be far more reasonable for
an observer to perceive that the student believes in the value of
community service and wishes to communicate his or her sup-
port of the organization's underlying philosophical mission.
0 3
The time of day when students perform this service further
compels the conclusion that an outside observer would not per-
ceive the student's actions as those actions of the school. Stu-
dents are required to devote time to these organizations during
weekday hours after the school day has officially ended, on
weekends, or during the summer."°  Absent indicia of school
sponsorship and the supervision that normally accompany after-
hours school events or programs but is lacking in mandatory
service programs, an observer would not necessarily impute the
actions of a high school student, which occur after established
school hours, to the school.'05
'0' See Farrell, supra note 62, at 316-17, 320-22, 329-33 (discussing publicity
surrounding litigation of both New York and Boston Parades).
102 See Dwight G. Duncan, Parading the First Amendment through the Streets of
South Boston, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 663, 665 (1996).
103 See Rome, supra note 97, at 553 ("A fundamental difference of perception
exists ... between viewing an individual student, far removed from the school cam-
pus or any school supervision, performing work in the community, and viewing a
large group of students observing exhibits at a museum [on a school-sponsored
trip]").
104 See Steirer, 987 F.2d at 991 (analyzing program guidelines).
'05 See id. at 997.
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B. Regulating Expressive Conduct: The O'Brien Test
Establishing that mandatory community service programs
constitute expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment
does not end the inquiry. The state may regulate expressive
conduct if the four requirements of the O'Brien test are met: (1)
the regulation is within the constitutional powers delegated to
the enacting body; (2) the regulation "furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest"; (3) the "interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression"; and (4) the "incidental re-
striction" on the First Amendment freedom is "no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of [the governmental] interest."1 6
Undoubtedly, a local school board has the power to promulgate
regulations defining the scope of the school's curriculum. An
analysis under the remaining three prongs of the O'Brien test
reveals that mandatory service programs are content-based
regulations that may be upheld only if they are necessary to
serve a compelling government interest and are narrowly tai-
lored to effectuate that interest.
1. Analysis of the Government Interests
Supporters of mandatory service programs proffer several
justifications for these initiatives, ranging from instilling the
value of community service in students to developing a more
moral citizenry.0 7 Community service programs require stu-
dents to select an organization, prepare for their placement, and
budget their time thereby serving additional educational goals.
These aspects of the program expose students to the various de-
mands of a professional environment and uniquely prepare them
to assume positions in the work force."8
"6 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); see supra notes 75-79 and
accompanying text (discussing permissible government regulation of symbolic
speech).
107 The Bethlehem Area School District articulated the objectives of their pro-
gram as follows:
1. Students will understand their responsibilities as citizens in dealing
with community issues.
2. Students will know that their concern about people and events in the
community can have positive effects.
3. Students will develop pride in assisting others.
4. Students will provide services to the community without receiving pay.
Steirer, 987 F.2d at 991 (quoting Bethlehem Area School District Guide).
" See Dennis D. Hutch & Suzanne Goldsmith, Community Service Builds Citi-
zenship, NATL L.J., Feb. 5, 1996, at A19 (identifying workplace preparation and
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School administrators and states enact mandatory commu-
nity service programs to facilitate the government's teaching of
fundamental values to students. The Supreme Court acknowl-
edges the unique role of public schools, recognizing that they are
important precisely because they instill fundamental societal
values while preparing students to assume the responsibilities of
citizenship."°9 In reality, however, these programs may not fur-
ther the government's interest in educating students about the
value of community service and developing a more moral citi-
zenry. While no empirical evaluations of the effectiveness of
community service in internalizing values of citizenship have
been conducted, one expert cites "a rich body of psychological re-
search that suggests that compelling behavior can undermine in-
trinsic motivation to undertake those behaviors at a later
time.""' According to this expert, by utilizing external con-
straints in the form of withholding diplomas for failing to com-
plete the program, school officials merely dampen the students'
natural altruistic drives."' The "boomerang effect" of requiring
pro-social activity under the threat of imminent punishment de-
creases a student's internal drive to participate in community
service and undermines the goal of developing a more moral citi-
112
zenry.The development of valuable life-skills, however, would con-
civic education as compelling educational goals furthered by mandatory service pro-
grams).
109 See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979); see also Susan H. Biten-
sky, A Contemporary Proposal for Reconciling the Free Speech Clause with Curricu-
lar Values Inculcation in the Public Schools, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 769, 780
(1995) ("V]alues inculcation at the elementary and secondary school levels has in-
herently positive benefits. Perhaps the foremost positive reason recommending val-
ues inculcation at these levels is that it is children to whom the schools are trying to
give an education in morals.").
"0 Mark S. Sobus, Mandating Community Service: Psychological Implications of
Requiring Pro-social Behavior, 19 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 153, 158, 160-65 (1995). In
addition, students may not be performing the requisite service and, outside of the
students who publicly challenge these programs, the schools appear ill-equipped to
enforce these requirements. See Fern Shen, Md. Students are Failing to Volunteer:
5000 Seniors Lagging on Service Mandate, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1996, at D3
(noting that 11% of seniors had not completed single hour of service despite state-
mandated 75 hour requirement).
:" See Sobus, supra note 110, at 161-74.
12 See id. at 179; see also Richard L. Roe, Valuing Student Speech: The Work of
Schools as Conceptual Development, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1269, 1296-99 (1995) (positing
that students internalize values through interactive processes and critical thinking
rather than through inculcative methods).
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stitute a sufficiently important governmental interest. In a
slightly different context, it has been judicially noted that "[a]
State has a legitimate interest not only in seeking to develop the
latent talents of its children but also in seeking to prepare them
for the lifestyle that they may later choose, or at least to provide
them with an option other than the life they have led in the
past."'13 Public school education includes both value encultura-
tion as well as practical development of skills that ensure future
lifestyle choices for the students."' The pursuit of life style op-
tions encompasses exposure not only to ideas that develop a stu-
dent's ability to participate intelligently in political discourse,
but also to ideas and experiences that may ultimately prepare
the student to assume a position with a prospective employer.
2. Content-based Nature of Restriction
The government's interest in requiring a program of manda-
tory service in order to teach civic values cannot be deemed unre-
lated to the expressive conduct compelled by such a requirement.
Unlike cases where the government's action has an incidental ef-
fect of regulating or suppressing the actor's free speech rights,"5
the compelled expression itself is the content that the govern-
ment seeks to regulate. Requiring students to profess an inter-
est in pro-social activities constitutes a content-based regulation
of speech.
116
The desire to instill in students practical skills which may
assist them in securing future employment is independent of the
113 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 240 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
11' See Pamela Ward, A Different Course Load: Westwood High Class Lets Stu-
dents Learn Through Community Service, AUSTIN AMERIcAN-STATESMAN, Oct. 15,
1996, available in 1996 WL 3447609, at *3 ("Community service can teach children
teamwork and improve social skills, key factors in successful employment in the
adult world."); see also Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 462 (2d Cir.
1996) ("The [mandatory community service] program [implemented by respondent
school board] may also help students develop a connection between school and work,
and *ve students an opportunity to evaluate possible careers.").
'ff See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968) (distinguishing
between facilitating government's ability to raise and support armies by criminaliz-
ing mutilation or alteration of draft cards, and cases where "the communication al-
legedly integral to the conduct is itself thought to be harmful).
116 See Bullock, supra note 6, at 21 ("Rather than guaranteeing that students
can work for any nonprofit organization-the only content-neutral standard avail-
able-officials generally approve only those organizations that 'serve the commu-
nity.' "); Horowitz, supra note 7, at Al ("[Clommunity service can be partisan poli-
tics by any other name, with students often performing the role of pamphleteer.").
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expressive nature of the conduct mandated. The presence of an
important non-speech objective would allow these programs to
survive the third prong of the O'Brien analysis.
3. Insufficiently Tailored
While the development of skills necessary to function effec-
tively as an employee could constitute a substantial government
interest unrelated to the exercise or restraint of free speech
rights, the methods adopted by school boards to facilitate these
programs constitute a greater restriction upon free speech rights
than is essential for the furtherance of that interest. Mandatory
community service programs, as the term implies, do not give
students the opportunity to opt out of participation.117 While of-
fering the students a wide range of service organizations to
choose from, or even permitting the students to design their own
program,118 the limited freedom to choose an organization whose
beliefs do not conflict with the students' fails to satisfy constitu-
tional scrutiny.
Mandatory participation in fundamental classroom instruc-
tion, such as requiring every student to complete a mathematics
assignment, is necessary to maintain an environment conducive
to learning and to avoid classroom disruption 19 Independent
student participation in an activity outside of the classroom,
however, is not likely to threaten to disrupt the academic set-
ting. While students may be aware that some of their colleagues
elected to "opt out" of the community service opportunities, the
tenuous possibility that some threat of disruption may arise from
117 The Second Circuit, in Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 460 (3d
Cir. 1996), concluded that the community service program implemented by the re-
spondent school board did not constitute involuntary servitude prohibited by the
Thirteenth Amendment. The court reasoned that the level of coercion inherent in
the program did not constitute involuntary servitude because the students could
'avoid the program and its penalties by attending private school, transferring to an-
other public high school, or studying at home to achieve a high school equivalency
certificate." Id. As the court noted, however, the option to transfer or obtain an
equivalency degree "might not render the program voluntary ..... Id.
18 See, e.g., Steirer v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d 989, 991 (discussing
Bethlehem Area School District program).
19 See Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395, 401 (D.S.C. 1974) (discussing adverse
effect on education caused by allowing children to leave classroom and avoid in-
structional material). By analogy, Herman Melville's short story of Bartleby the
scrivener demonstrates the danger of allowing an employee to "prefer not to" per-
form an assignment. HERMAN MELVILLE, BARTLEBY THE SCRIVENER, in THE
NORTON INTRODUCTION TO LITERATURE 365 (3d ed. 1981).
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this decision does not authorize the state to compel the student
to become a hypocrite.20
C. Protection Afforded Symbolic Speech Where the Regulation
Fails the O'Brien Test
Restrictions upon expressive conduct which fail to satisfy the
O'Brien analysis may still be valid if they are consistent with
traditional First Amendment jurisprudence. Symbolic speech
can be constitutionally regulated if pure speech could also be
regulated under the same circumstances. 2' The expressive activ-
ity may be prohibited on the basis of its message only if that
message falls within the categories of speech punishable consis-
tent with First Amendment jurisprudence.122  In addition, the
time, place, and manner of the symbolic speech may be regulated
so long as the restriction is "content-neutral, narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest, and leave[s] open ample
alternative channels of communication.""
'20 In Goetz v. Ansell, 477 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1973), the Second Circuit held that a
student has a First Amendment right to refuse to stand during a flag ceremony and
to refuse to leave the room during the ceremony. The court reasoned that the act of
standing was itself part of the pledge and the student could not be compelled to do
so over his or her deeply held beliefs. See id. at 637-38. The court concluded that the
school could not punish non-participation and being required to leave the classroom
during the ceremony might be viewed by some students as having that effect. See id.
at 638. In response to the argument that Tinker does not protect conduct that
"materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder ..." the court wrote
"[t]here is no evidence here of disruption of classwork or disorder or invasion of the
rights of others." Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
513 (1969)). Cf. Comment, Symbolic Speech and Compelled Expression, Wooley v.
Maynard, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 797, 802 (holding that right to refrain from speaking
by covering state motto on license plate is included within the concept of individual
freedom of mind).
12 See 4 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 76, § 20.49, at 362.
12 See id. The twin messages asserted by the student performing community
service, the value of altruistic behavior and the ideological viewpoint of the service
organization, could only fall within the ambit of unprotected speech under extreme
circumstances. For this reason, application of the categories of unprotected speech
to the expressive conduct at issue is not a focus of this Note.
'23 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(holding that policy affording exclusive access to school mail system to union, se-
lected by teachers as exclusive bargaining representative, did not violate First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights); see Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (holding National Park Service regulation prohibiting
camping in certain parks not violative of First Amendment even where involving
expressive behavior). See generally Helen Hershkoff, Aggressive Panhandling Laws:
Do These Statutes Violate the Constitution? Yes: Silencing the Homeless, A-B.A. J. 40
(June 1993) (discussing constitutionality of statutes designed to curb aggressive
1997]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
1. Analysis of Purported Government Interest
The development of skills that assist students in securing
employment and the indoctrination of altruistic values clearly
constitute compelling state interests. The sole purpose of public
school education is to equip students with the intellectual ca-
pabilities and moral values necessary to function productively in
our society."4 Community service programs are necessary to
fulfill this special aspect of the state's educational mandate.
While some schools offer courses geared towards developing
practical skills, it is very difficult to create an atmosphere analo-
gous to a structured, disciplined, professional setting in a class-
room.
2. Analysis of the Means Adopted to Further These Interests
While the goals of these programs withstand constitutional
scrutiny, the means adopted by the authorities who create them
fail to withstand constitutional review. "Precision of regulation
must be the touchstone in an area so closely" related to First
Amendment rights since these rights require "breathing space to
survive. " "' Mandatory participation under the threat of with-
holding the student's diploma does not afford sufficient
"breathing space" to constitute a permissible, narrowly tailored
means for two reasons. First, voluntary community service pro-
grams, or programs allowing the student an opportunity to "opt
out," are arguably more effective in developing a sense of altru-
ism and an awareness of the societal blights impairing our coun-
try. Second, mandatory service programs do not afford the stu-
dent sufficient alternate channels of communication since the
student may not refuse participation and avoid punishment for
refusing to espouse a message offensive to the student's deeply
held beliefs.
School authorities, under a statutory delegation of power by
state legislatures, possess the power to select the system of in-
struction and the course of study in public schools.'26 While
school authorities possess broad discretion to define the curricu-
begging).
124 See, e.g., supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
125 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 438 (1963).
126 See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 801 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1997) (requiring




lum and enforce regulations designed to insure the school's
proper operation, the deference accorded to these authorities
must be tempered by constitutional considerations.
School authorities, however, are not required to design cur-
ricular programs that allow dissenting students to "opt out."
127
The broad deference afforded school officials in developing the
curriculum often forces students to be exposed to materials they
may find offensive."2 Students may also be required to partici-
pate in tests and classroom exercises concerning these offensive
materials. Mandatory community service programs, however,
infringe deeper into the realm of liberties protected by the First
Amendment. Rather than merely exposing a student to materi-
als he or she may wish to avoid, these programs compel each
student to proclaim publicly the values and ideology represented
by the group for which they work, 2 9 regardless of whether these
ideals offend the student's personal beliefs.
Furthermore, mandatory service programs deny students
any practical alternatives to avoid espousal of the state's mes-
sage. While students do not have a fundamental right to receive
a publicly funded education,13 the judiciary should seek to pro-
127 See Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 532-34 (1st Cir.
1995) (denying parents' privacy claim to direct upbringing of children because par-
ents do not have a broad-based right to restrict flow of information to public school
students, such as compulsory attendance at sexually-explicit AIDS awareness as-
sembly), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1044 (1996); Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395, 399
(D.N.H. 1974) (denying parents' claim that right to control upbringing of child re-
quired school officials to excuse student from mandatory sex education classes be-
cause State has paramount and recognized interest in providing proper and ena-
bling education for children).
28 Parents and students have forced schools to permit students to opt out of of-
fensive programs that constituted a part of the school's regular curriculum. Some
courts have held that the failure of the school to allow students to opt out of sex
education programs implicates constitutional concerns. See, e.g., Valent v. New Jer-
sey State Bd. of Educ., 274 A.2d 832, 836 (N.J. 1971). Other courts have upheld sex
education courses because these courses allowed objecting students to avoid partici-
pation. See, e.g., Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mako Co. Bd. of Educ., 124 Cal.
Rptr. 68, 83 (1975). Similarly, the 1991 condom distribution program adopted by
New York City was held unconstitutional because it failed to allow parents to in-
struct the school not to distribute condoms to their children. See Alfonso v. Fer-
nandez, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259, 261 (2d Dep't. 1993). But see Curtis v. School Comm. of
Falmouth, 652 N.E.2d 580, 585-86 (Mass. 1995) (upholding constitutionality of high
school condom distribution program that did not allow for parental veto), cert. de-
nied, 116 S. Ct. 753 (1996).
" See Rome, supra note 97, at 549-50 (explaining that students participating in
mandatory community service programs will be perceived as adopting values of or-
ganizations for which they are working).
so See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-37 (1973)
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tect those students who would be denied the benefits of their
hard work simply for exercising their constitutional rights.'31
The denial of a publicly funded education may work severe eco-
nomic hardship upon the family who would have to pay tuition at
a private school." 2 Similarly, while a student could obtain a high
school equivalency degree, the student's failure to obtain a de-
gree from an accredited high school may adversely affect his or
her choice of post-secondary educational opportunities.3  Forc-
ing a dissenting student to choose from such illusory options
would elevate form over substance and leave the student without
a remedy for a violation of his or her corresponding constitu-
tional right.
Even a program containing an "opt out" provision may not be
sufficient to render such a compelled service program valid un-
der traditional constitutional jurisprudence. Justice Brennan,
concurring in Abington Township School District v. Schemp, dis-
cussed the constitutional dilemma presented by an opt out pro-
vision from mandatory school prayer:
[Bly requiring what is tantamount in the eyes of teachers and
(refuting argument that relationship between education and fundamental freedoms
of speech and voting establish education as fundamental right); Houston v. Prosser,
361 F. Supp. 295, 298 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (denying student's claim that school officials'
policy deprived her of equal educational opportunity because education is not fun-
damental right or liberty). But see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986)
("[Tihis Court has not yet definitively settled the questions whether a minimally
adequate education is a fundamental right and whether a statute alleged to dis-
criminatorily infringe that right should be accorded heightened equal protection re-
view."); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (noting that "[plublic education is not
a 'right,' yet is more than mere "governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other
social welfare [benefits]").131 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 595 (1992) ("[To say a teenage student
has a real choice not to attend her high school graduation is formalistic in the ex-
treme.").
1.2 See Davidson Goldin, Rising Tuition: Education Loans Hit Home-More Par-
ents Financing Private High School Costs, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 22, 1995,
at 10 (discussing high and rising cost of private high school education and resulting
financial burden on families).
' See Lindley H. Clark, Jr., Even Poor Schools Beat 'Life Experience,' WALL ST.
J., Oct. 23, 1991, at A14 (asserting that high school equivalency degree, such as
General Educational Development certificate ("GED"), is not equivalent of high
school diploma obtained by graduating from high school program, and noting that
studies show equivalency certificate holders fare "only very, very slightly" better
than high school dropouts in job market). But see Herbert Kupferberg, If You Never
Made it through High School but You Wish You Had: A Test that Can Change Your
Life, Hous. CHRON., Sep. 13, 1992, at 18 (praising GED as providing post-secondary
educational opportunities since GED is accepted and recognized by large percentage
of American universities and most employers).
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schoolmates to a profession of disbelief, or at least of noncon-
formity, the [opt out] procedure may well deter those children
who do not wish to participate for any reason based upon the
dictates of conscience from exercising an indisputably constitu-
tional right to be excused. Thus the excusal provision in its op-
eration subjects them to a cruel dilemma. In consequence, even
devout children may well avoid claiming their right and simply
continue to participate in exercises distasteful to them because
of an understandable reluctance to be stigmatized as atheists or
non conformists simply on the basis of their request.'T
Students may feel strong pressure not to opt out for fear of
being labeled a non-conformist. 13 5 This potential "chilling" effect
upon the student's constitutionally protected right to be free
from forced espousal of the state's message should render even
service programs containing an "opt out" provision constitu-
tionally infirm.
D. Application of Traditional Student Speech Cases to
Mandatory Community Service Programs
Rather than applying traditional First Amendment juris-
prudential principles to mandatory community service programs
that fail to withstand scrutiny under the O'Brien analysis,
courts may choose to analyze such programs under the signifi-
cantly more deferential standards enunciated by the Supreme
Court in defining student speech rights. The landmark student
expression decisions form a labyrinthine framework upon which
predicative statements concerning judicial assessment of manda-
tory community service programs may be made only with great
trepidation. The government, in its role as educator, must en-
sure that students develop those fundamental values necessary
to become tomorrow's participants in our democratic society.
That mission necessitates content-based restrictions upon ex-
pression which would clearly be unconstitutional outside of the
educational setting.
While the liberties enjoyed by high school students are not
'34 374 U.S. 203, 289-90 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
13 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 593 (noting coercive nature of secondary school setting).
But see Scott Vaughn Carroll, Lee v. Weisman: Amateur Psychology or an Accurate
Representation of Adolescent Development, How Should Courts Evaluate Psychologi-
cal Evidence?, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 513, 537-38 (1993) (suggesting
that although adolescents are subject to peer pressure to conform, there is no con-
clusive evidence showing such pressure is pervasive enough to restrict exercise of
free will).
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necessarily co-extensive with the free speech rights of citizens in
the general populace, public school students do not relinquish
their right to free speech in exchange for a free education. As
the Court eloquently stated in Tinker, and reaffirmed in subse-
quent decisions, students retain a degree of First Amendment
protection because they do not "shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."'36
Courts are therefore required to balance the students' rights as
citizens of our country against the unique governmental interest
in transmitting various community values through public
schools.
The Court in Tinker established that students may express
their opinions within the educational setting so long as such ex-
pression does not "materially and substantially disrupt" the
school environment."7 Since Tinker, the Court appears to have
afforded great deference to school officials in defining their
school's educational mandate and in regulating speech that
threatens the fulfillment of that goal. The use of the public fo-
rum doctrine, and the willingness of lower federal courts to apply
a public forum analysis to student expression occurring outside
the context of official school programs or events, expanded the
reach of Hazelwood and Fraser to encompass any speech that
could reasonably be perceived as bearing the imprimatur of
school approval."8
116 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
137 Id. at 513.
138 In Hazelwood, the Court expressly differentiated between toleration of stu-
dent speech and promotion of student speech. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260, 270-73 (1988). As Professor Salomone noted, the Court defined the
distinction between toleration and promotion as follows:
[Toleration] addresses educators' ability to silence a student's personal ex-
pression that happens to occur on the school premises .... [Promotion] con-
cerns educators' authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical
productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and
members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of
the school.
Salomone, supra note 31, at 267 (alterations in original) (quoting Hazelwood, 484
U.S. at 271).
Hazelwood expressly held that Tinker did not apply to "government sponsored"
student speech and other "government induced" expressive activities which occur
pursuant to a school's curriculum "whether or not they occur in a traditional class-
room setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty members and designed to
impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences." Ha-
zelwood, 484 U.S. at 271. Yet Hazelwood expressly preserved Tinker, indicating that
the rule of Tinker would apply "for determining when a school may punish [non-
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This summary of the landmark decisions indicates that
courts must ascertain the appropriate doctrinal strand of analy-
sis in order to determine the constitutionality of mandatory
service programs. If the speech act required by these programs,
while compelled, would be thought by a reasonable observer to be
compelled, then the observer would dissociate the content of the
speech from the individual speaker. Under this premise, the
compelled speech would be non-expressive and unprotected by
the First Amendment. If courts deem mandatory service pro-
grams to be constitutionally protected compelled expression,
then the controlling precedent should be Barnette. Under the
rationale of the Court in Barnette, mandatory service programs
would be struck down as violative of the students' right to be free
from compelled articulation of a government sponsored message
that violates the students' deeply held beliefs.
While Barnette appears to be the appropriate precedent, a
court might decide to apply the rationale of Tinker and its prog-
eny to a situation where a school compels the student to speak
rather than where it regulates student speech. A court may ap-
ply the reasoning of Tinker and its progeny since the Supreme
Court has not entertained a compelled student speech case since
Barnette, decided prior to the Court's pronouncements in Tinker,
Hazelwood, and Fraser. An analysis and an attempted applica-
tion of the Hazelwood and Tinker rules to mandatory service
programs, however, reveal both the analytical unsuitability of
these precedents for the unique factual situations presented by
mandatory community service programs and the probable un-
constitutionality of these programs even under a tortured inter-
pretation of Hazelwood and Tinker.
1. Hazelwood
The Hazelwood standard involves two stages of inquiry: (1)
whether the student expression at issue occurs in a context im-
plicating the school's educational mission; and (2) whether the
school's decision to implement these programs is "reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."" 9 In order to satisfy
the requirement that the student expression occur in the context
of an educational activity, regardless of whether the speech oc-
curs inside or outside of the classroom, the activity must be ei-
curricular] student expression ...." Id. at 272.
'5' 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
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ther "supervised by faculty members and designed to impart
particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audi-
ences" 140 or one that "students, parents, and members of the
public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the
school."'4 ' The second prong of the Hazelwood inquiry is satisfied
"so long as [the educator's] actions are reasonably related to le-
gitimate pedagogical concerns.""
Mandatory service programs do not constitute an educa-
tional activity under which educators may constitutionally con-
trol student expression. The Bethlehem program, for example,
requires faculty supervision in both the formative stages of se-
lecting and designing the service experience as well as the stu-
dent's synopsis of his or her experience. The actual perform-
ance of the expressive activity, however, occurs far from the
schoolhouse gates. While the Supreme Court in Hazelwood spe-
cifically did not confine educational activities to those which oc-
cur on the school's property, the required "supervision" of educa-
tional activities that occur outside of the school should be read in
conjunction with the Court's accompanying articulation of edu-
cational activity; one which would reasonably be perceived to
bear the imprimatur of the school.'" Interpreting the Hazelwood
test in this fashion would be both consistent with the rationale
employed by lower federal courts in applying Hazelwood and
would allow schools to impose service programs only when there
exists a sufficient indication of school sponsorship.45 Without
overt indicia of such school sponsorship of the students' service
activities reasonable observers would fail to attribute the stu-
140 Id. at 271.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 273.
13 See Steirer v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d 989, 991-92 (1993)
(discussing program guidelines).
144 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271; see also Stanley Ingber, supra note 87, at
469 (asserting that defining "school sponsored" activities broadly "allows schools,
with the imprimatur of constitutionality, to be structured to enforce subservience to
an unrelenting authority").
145 Applying the Hazelwood test in this manner would comport with the recog-
nized power of the schools to regulate student behavior which occurs outside of the
classroom. See Thomas v. Board of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043,
1050 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that school administrators could not punish students
for publishing "offensive" publication where students ensured that publication was
conceived, published, and distributed outside of school grounds); Braesch v. De-
Pasquale, 265 N.W.2d 842, 846 (Neb. 1978) (upholding school rules prohibiting use
of drugs or alcohol by students participating in interscholastic sports).
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dents' speech acts to the school.
In addition, applying Hazelwood in this manner to the
unique factual situation presented by mandatory service pro-
grams comports with the recognized power of school officials to
control student behavior outside of the classroom. School
authorities have the power to regulate student behavior outside
of the classroom only if such behavior has a substantial effect
upon the educational process.'46 The power of school officials to
control or punish student behavior outside of the classroom
arises from the judicial assessment that the school stands in loco
parentis during the school day.4 7 Limiting the power of school
officials to proscribe student behavior only upon a showing of
disruption of the educational process constitutes judicial recog-
nition of the difficulty facing students in their attempt to comply
with the wishes of the school's administrators during the school
hours and the wishes of their parents once the school day ends.'48
The Hazelwood standard delineates the powers school
authorities possess to restrict student expression. Attempting to
apply this standard to mandatory community service programs
reveals that the Court did not intend Tinker and its progeny to
disturb its rule in Barnette.' The Hazelwood test defines the
power of school officials to restrict student speech in order to
preserve an environment conducive to fulfilling the state's edu-
cational mandate and allowing the school to avoid being per-
ceived as tacitly approving a student's views on divisive issues.
The message conveyed by students engaging in state mandated
community service, however, is a message from which the state
would not want to be dissociated; a message promoting the value
" See Braesch, 265 N.W.2d at 846 (upholding school rules prohibiting use of
drugs or alcohol by student athletes); Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1050 (holding school
administrators could not punish students for publishing "offensive" publication
where students ensured publication was conceived, published, and distributed out-
side of school grounds).
147 See Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1037, 1039 (7th Cir. 1969). This power granted to
school authorities, however, must be shared with the students' parents, especially
where the regulation involves intimately personal matters. See id. The doctrine of
loco parentis is inapplicable when parents and schools disagree on methods of dis-
cipline and where there is no showing of school disruption. See id. at 1037-38.
"" See id. See generally Daniel E. Feld, Annotation, Right to Discipline Pupil for
Conduct Away from School Grounds or not Immediately Connected with School Ac-
tivities, 53 A.L.R.3d 1124 (1973 & Supp. 1996).
19 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272 (holding that Tinker standard for punishing
student expression is not same standard to be used when school refuses to sponsor
student speech).
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of altruism.
Furthermore, the educational decision to implement a man-
datory service program does not require the same degree of judi-
cial deference to the expertise of school board officials as purely
curricular decisions. The Court in Hazelwood proffered three
reasons why the judiciary should defer to public school officials
within the realm of educational activities: (1) to maximize the
educational or "teaching" value of an activity; (2) to protect im-
mature student audiences; and (3) to avoid erroneous attribution
of school sponsorship."0  Judicial deference to the decision of
educators to implement a mandatory service program is not sup-
ported by any of the reasons articulated in Hazelwood. In addi-
tion, compelling expression in contravention of a student's deeply
held beliefs fails to develop the charitable values these programs
seek to instill."' Moreover, the speech acts at issue in commu-
nity service are directed toward the public at large, rather than
solely toward captive, immature student audiences. Finally,
these programs are not designed to avoid erroneous attribution
of student speech to the school. Students' forced participation in
community service programs is constitutionally prohibited, com-
pelled expression precisely because the schools fail to establish
sufficient indicia of overt sponsorship which would lead a rea-
sonable observer to conclude that the school was attempting to
communicate through the actions of the students."'
The Hazelwood analysis is also inappropriate since it is
predicated upon the public forum doctrine-a framework devel-
oped by the Supreme Court to determine when the government's
interest in limiting the use of governmental property "to its in-
tended purpose outweighs the interest of those wishing to use
the property for other purposes. '  The Hazelwood Court's em-
phasis on the government's ownership of the property upon
which the speech act occurs indicates the fundamental unsuit-
ability of applying that standard to mandatory community serv-
ice programs. Mandatory service programs require students to
1 0 Id. at 271.
See supra notes 9, 109 and accompanying text.
152 See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text (comparing mandatory service
programs to Boston St. Patrick's Day Parade and concluding that reasonable ob-
server would not impute actions of individual student to school where student is far
removed from campus or any school supervision while performing service).




enter their community and perform altruistic acts in the "real
world." A student electing to distribute pamphlets for a non-
profit organization on a city sidewalk would place a court apply-
ing the Hazelwood rationale in a judicial quagmire. The student
pamphleteer would be engaged in expressive activity in a "place [
which by long tradition ... [has] been devoted to assembly and
debate." '154 In order to regulate speech in a traditional public fo-
rum such as this, the regulation must survive heightened judi-
cial scrutiny." In determining the constitutionality of service
programs under Hazelwood, therefore, a court would be forced to
either: (1) abandon the public forum doctrine underlying the Ha-
zelwood standard; (2) apply public forum principles and ascer-
tain the constitutionality of each student's service requirement
based upon the characteristics of the locale where the student is
working; or (3) create a "non-public forum bubble" around the
student, deeming his or her speech to come from the classroom
regardless of the student's actual physical location.
2. Tinker
The Tinker test balances the students' exercise of First
Amendment rights against the conflicting rules of school
authorities. The Tinker test is clearly inappropriate for analyz-
ing the unique factual difficulties of mandatory community
service programs. Tinker, as modified by Hazelwood, requires
school officials to establish that the non-curricular student ex-
pression sought to be regulated " 'materially and substantially
interfere[s] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in
the operation of the school.""" The student speech at issue
here, however, must be deemed to take place in a curricular set-
ting since the student is laboring to fulfill a graduation require-
ment. In addition, requiring a student to engage in communica-
"' Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); see
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988) (characterizing residential streets as
traditional public forum).
15 The government may enforce content-neutral restrictions on speech in a
public forum only if the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a significant gov-
ernmental interest and leaves open adequate alternative channels for communica-
tion. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984).
Content-based restrictions on speech in these areas must serve a compelling gov-
ernmental interest and the restrictions must be narrowly drawn to achieve that in-
terest. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
"; 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th
Cir. 1996)).
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tive behavior promoting a message that he or she would prefer
not to communicate is neither based upon a potentially disrup-
tive effect upon the educational environment, nor infringes upon
the rights of other students. 
157
3. Barnette
Barnette constitutes an independent limitation upon the
power to regulate student speech defined by Tinker and its prog-
eny. Although school officials may constitutionally restrict stu-
dent speech, they may not compel an expression. 158 While public
school students sacrifice a vestige of their constitutional rights,
schools cannot use their power as educators to prescribe a par-
ticular message which students are forced to avow. The role of
the student is to receive the government's message, not to serve
as a vehicle for the promulgation of that message.159
The government, in its role as educator, must educate, in-
form, and reinforce communal bonds since the development of a
well-informed citizenry is crucial to the maintenance of a system
of free expression. 6 ' Equally essential to such a system, how-
ever, is the right of the individual to form and hold beliefs.16 1 The
government must carefully navigate between the constitutionally
permissible power to influence belief through education and the
unconstitutional coercion of beliefs. Professor Emerson aptly
and concisely describes the tightrope that educators must trav-
erse:
157 See, e.g., Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 528-31 (9th Cir.
1992) (holding that school could not prohibit students from supporting teachers'
strike by wearing buttons, because buttons were not vulgar per se, school-
sponsored, or manifestly disruptive and therefore were permitted student speech
under Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood). See generally Hafen & Hafen, supra note 4,
at 396-411 (surveying federal courts' application of Tinker and its progeny).
118 See West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
'9 The Barnette Court, in dicta, went on to state that attempts to compel unity
have faltered throughout history and are, in fact, counter-productive. The
"tuiltimate futility of such attempts to compel coherence is the lesson of every such
effort from the Roman drive to stamp out Christianity ... [to] the Inquisition ...
[and] the Siberian exiles ... down to the fast failing efforts of our present totalitar-
ian enemies." Id. at 641; see also Salomone, supra note 3, at 184 (advocating that
individual students and parents should determine values taught in schools, rather
than solely government indoctrinating value systems and beliefs).
"0 See Mark G. Yudof, Library Book Selection and the Public Schools: The Quest
for the Archimedean Point, 59 IND. L.J. 527, 527-37 (1984) (asserting that proper
goal of education is to assimilate autonomous individuals into society through sys-
tem of uniform value inculcation).
'1 See THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 21 (1970).
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It is true that the line between persuasion and coercion may not
always be easy to trace. But the distinction is fundamental. By
its very nature a system of free expression involves-in fact is
designed to achieve-persuasion. The government is entitled to
participate in this system. But the introduction of coercion de-
stroys the system as a free one.1
62
Mandatory community service programs fail to traverse Pro-
fessor Emerson's tightrope and plummet into the abyss of uncon-
stitutional coercion. Rather than springing from the student's
conscience, the decision to provide charitable services arises from
a state-imposed mandate. Mandatory service programs do not
attempt to persuade students to engage in pro-social behavior by
fostering the inherent desire of some students to perform com-
munity service, nor do they encourage parents to act as role
models for pro-social behavior. Furthermore, they fail to raise a
student's awareness of his or her intimate connection with the
community and the need to benefit society as a whole by assist-
ing others." Instead, mandatory service programs utilize the
external coercive constraint of withholding a student's diploma
to attempt to force the development of civic values."
The Third Circuit in Steirer concluded that the Bethlehem
program did not force the students to declare a prescribed belief
because the plaintiffs failed to introduce evidence indicating that
a student who criticized the program would not receive credit for
his service." The court reasoned that the program did not com-
pel expression because the students were assured that they
would receive credit regardless of whether they chose to affirm
the values the school intended to inculcate. 66 This conclusion,
however, misconstrued the student's right to disagree, "a right"
16 Id. at 22.
163 See Sobus, supra note 110, at 179-80 (proposing that having parents act as
role models of pro-social behavior who provide praise for children undertaking
community service projects would be more conducive to generating lasting pro-social
behavioral inclinations in students).
'" It is quite possible that utilizing coercive external constraints may not only
be constitutionally prohibited, but may also cause the opposite of their intended ef-
fect. See id. at 179 (positing that "[i]f the goal is to instill internal values that will
drive the behavior, this will require deemphasizing [sic] external situational con-
straints").
1c5 Steirer v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d 989, 996-97 (3d Cir. 1993)
("There is no basis in the record to support the argument that the students who
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that must be present to avoid any constitutional violations.
In order to avoid becoming the "closed-circuit recipients" of
state-imposed communication, 167 students must retain the right
to express freely those personal opinions that differ from offi-
cially prescribed doctrine. Students' abilities to disagree publicly
with state-sponsored messages operate as a check upon the
state's power and prevent the compulsion of "confess[ing] by
word or act" the messages of educators.'68 Mandatory service
programs deny students such opportunities and fail to provide
students with adequate alternate methods of communication to
eradicate the public perception that the student agrees with the
asserted message.
The Supreme Court in Barnette did not state that educators
may not compel students to ratify officially prescribed beliefs; it
held that the state could not force a student to declare a belief.
169
Merely allowing a student to voice his or her disagreement with
the compelled expression, after being forced to express these of-
ficially prescribed sentiments under the threat of failing to
graduate, does not obviate the constitutional violation. The op-
portunity for a student to inform school officials that he or she
did not internalize the lessons of civic responsibility which the
school sought to instill is not the equivalent of the opportunity to
reject these beliefs contemplated by Barnette.
Similarly, the mere presence of a multitude of potential
service organizations and volunteer opportunities fails to dimin-
ish the coercive nature of the program. Mandatory service pro-
grams do not contemplate the diversity of expression required to
mitigate the compelled nature of the student expression. Stu-
dents, regardless of the organization on whose behalf they work,
are limited to professing a pre-selected message-the value of al-
truism. By allowing the student the limited freedom to choose
which organization he or she will work for, school officials avoid
a second constitutional violation. That second violation would
occur if the school also limited the list of approved organizations
and thereby required the student to utter the message of a serv-
ice organization whose doctrinal philosophy conflicted with the
167 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511
(1969).
168 West Virginia Bd. Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
"9 Id. at 640 ("National unity as an end which officials may foster by persuasion
and example is not in question. The problem is whether under our Constitution
compulsion as here employed is a permissible means for its achievement.").
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student's personal beliefs. The possibility that a student may
"volunteer" to work for an organization whose philosophy is con-
sistent with his or her own does not forestall the implicit profes-
sion of the value of community service compelled by educators.
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts must afford school officials broad discretion to design
a school's curriculum. Discretion is necessary since educators
are charged with instilling students with the democratic princi-
ples and cultural commitment necessary to ensure their devel-
opment into responsible citizens. This judgment, however, must
be balanced against the significantly tempered rights retained by
the students and their parents. High school students require
guidance in the exercise of their constitutional rights since they
are neither entitled to, nor capable of properly exercising, the
full rights of citizenship accorded to adults. A student taught in
an environment where opposition to orthodox values is sup-
pressed, however, receives conflicting signals regarding demo-
cratic values and the tolerance of opposing viewpoints. Requir-
ing students to adopt publicly the message of school authorities
tramples upon their First Amendment rights and inhibits their
maturation into principled adults who can safeguard those con-
stitutional guarantees requiring societal participation. Although
the goals of mandatory community service programs may be
admirable, they transgress the constitutional limitations on the
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